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Abstract. We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and
preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic.
Optimization of the joint benefit of the vendor and the buyers turns the toy market into a combinatorial
matching problem. We compare the optimal solutions found with and without a matchmaker, examine the
resulting inequality between the market participants, and study the impact of correlations on the system.
PACS. 89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, business and management – 89.75.-k Com-
plex systems
1 Introduction
The study of complex economic systems has attracted at-
tention of many physicists. They have contributed to the
field with several highly simplified, yet influential, mod-
els such as the minority game [1], percolation [2], scaling
models of financial markets [3], as well as with a set of
useful tools and insights [4, 5, 6, 7].
Adopting a simplifying point of view characteristic for
the works mentioned above, in this paper we focus on the
interactions between consumers and producers. These in-
teractions represent a classical example of decision-making
under uncertainty [9] where the limited information avail-
able to the contract participants results in a risk of mak-
ing a wrong decision. In the standard economic litera-
ture, problems related to the interactions of consumers
and producers are as diverse as the research of consumer
behavior [8], the question of trust [10], the economics of
information [11, 12], and the behavior of entire firms and
industries [13, 14].
This work is particularly motivated by the classical
stable-marriage problem [15, 16] in which N men and N
women all have their individual preferences and are to
be matched one-to-one. Almost inevitably, it’s impossi-
ble to satisfy everyone and hence stable matchings (where
no one has the possibility to exchange the assigned part-
ner for a better one) or the optimal matching (where the
total satisfaction is maximal) are of interest. The stable
marriage problem has implications in many economic and
social systems. It can represent matching of job seekers
and employers or that of lodgers and landlords; it is also
a metaphor for problems in logistics [17] and in online
marketing [18].
We study a situation where a certain product is avail-
able in multiple variants and the preferences of both the
buyer and the vendor for each of the variants can be rep-
resented by numbers (the higher the number, the more
appreciated the variant). The matching of the buyer and
the vendor is then achieved by the selection of a single
variant to be delivered. In the given framework, we first
study outcomes achieved with the help of an external
matchmaker—an idealized agent supervising the market
and having perfect information about all the preferences.
In particular, we investigate the inequality between profits
enjoyed by the two involved parties and how correlations
of the preferences influence the system’s behavior.
For comparison, we study two simple matchmaker-free
models of variant selection. In the first matchmaker-free
model, the vendor makes consecutive offers and the buyer
decides whether to accept an offer or not. Our results show
that while this approach results in a small decrease of
the total satisfaction, it considerably decreases the buyer-
vendor inequality. In the second matchmaker-free model,
the buyer is searching for the optimal variant by himself.
We study the optimal number of examined variants and
show that under some conditions, this number may be
infinite: the buyer is tempted to search forever. Numer-
ical simulations of the studied models are in most cases
accompanied with approximate analytical results.
2 Trading under matchmaker’s supervision
We assume that a given product is available in N differ-
ent variants which can be prepared by a vendor and fulfill,
to a greater or lesser degree, needs of a given buyer. The
buyer’s utility from purchasing variant α is denoted by
xα and the vendor’s utility from providing this variant is
denoted by yα. The matchmaker optimizes the joint ben-
efit by maximizing the total utility uα(xα, yα). Obviously,
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the system’s behavior depends on the choice of the utility
function and on the nature of the utilities xα, yα—we shall
study different settings in the following sections.
2.1 Linear utility function
The simplest form of the total utility is
uα(xα, yα) = xα + yα (1)
where both utilities are merely summed with equal weights.
In addition, we assume that both xα and yα are random
variables drawn from the uniform distribution in the range
[−1, 1], U(−1, 1), and that they are uncorrelated. The dis-
tribution f(uα) then has the tent-shaped form
f(uα) =
{
(2 + uα)/4 uα ∈ [−2; 0),
(2− uα)/4 uα ∈ [0; 2]. (2)
The probability that a randomly selected variant has the
total utility greater than uα is P (uα) :=
∫ 2
uα
f(u′) du′.
Since utilities of different variants are mutually indepen-
dent, the largest utility um := max
N
α=1 uα has the distri-
bution
g(um) = Nf(um)[1− P (um)]N−1. (3)
Here the factor N appears because any of N variants can
have the largest utility, the factor f(um) is the occurrence
probability of um, and the factor [1 − P (um)]N−1 is the
probability that the remaining N − 1 variants have utili-
ties lower than um; Eq. (3) is also known as the extreme
statistics of the random variable um. We study the model
by computing 〈um〉 (by 〈x〉 we denote the average of x
over all possible realizations). Since P (uα < 0) = 1/2 and
um < 0 only when all N variants have uα < 0, it follows
that P (um < 0) = 2
−N . Hence, assuming N ≫ 1, we
can confine our computation to um > 0 where f(um) =
(2 − um)/4 and P (um) = (2 − um)2/8. When N is large,
P (〈um〉) is small and thus we can use the approximation
1 − P (um) ≈ exp[−P (um)]. After replacing the lower in-
tegration bound in 〈um〉 with −∞ (this is again justified
by the negligible probability of um < 0) we obtain
〈um〉 ≈ 2N
N − 1 −
√
2piN2
(N − 1)3 ≈ 2−
√
2pi
N
(4)
where we neglected terms of order O(1/N) and higher.
We see that as N increases, 〈um〉 rapidly approaches its
upper bound—the difference scales with N−1/2. Numeri-
cal computation of 〈um〉 shows that the relative error of
Eq. (4) decreases fast with N : it is less than 1% already
for N = 17.
Apart from the optimal total utility um, the inequality
between the vendor and the buyer is also of interest. If
variant β maximizes uα, we say that the buyer-vendor
inequality is |xβ−yβ| and denote its expected value by ∆.
To compute ∆, one needs to realize that for any given uα,
the term |xα − yα| ranges from 0 to 2− uα (this maximal
difference is achieved when one of the two utilities is 1
and the other is uα − 1). Since xα and yα are uniformly
distributed, all possible values of |xα − yα| are equally
probable and hence 〈|xα − yα|〉 = 1− uα/2. In turn, ∆ =
1− 〈um〉/2 =
√
N/(2pi) which can be easily confirmed by
numerical computation.
2.2 Affecting the inequality
Blind maximization of the total utility may not be the
best policy because it can result in large inequalities be-
tween society members. In an effort to prevent that, the
matchmaker may adopt the utility function
u′α(xα, yα) =
(
xkα + y
k
α
)1/k
(k > 0). (5)
where the variants that have one or both utilities negative
are automatically excluded (they do not have the chance
to become selected anyway). Choosing k ≫ 1 in Eq. (5)
favors those pairs (xα, yα) where at least one of the utili-
ties is high, while k < 1 favors more equal splitting of the
total utility. The expected value of u′m := max
N
α=1 u
′
α can
be computed in the same way as in the previous section,
yielding
〈um′〉 ≈ 2−
(
Γ (12 +
1
k )
√
pi
Γ (1 + 1k )4
1−1/k
)1/2
N−1/2. (6)
Interestingly, 〈u′m〉 scales with N in the same way as 〈um〉.
The expected buyer-vendor inequality is now a func-
tion of k, ∆(k). Numerical results shown in Fig. 1 confirm
our initial insight that ∆(k) grows with k. In particular,
the value 0.5 achieved for k & 100 corresponds to pick-
ing the variant which maximizes one of the utilities and
paying no attention to the other utility. In that case, the
selected variant has the larger of the two utilities close to
1 and the other one is 0.5 on average: together we have
limk→∞∆(k) = 0.5. Further, it can be seen in Fig. 1 that
k < 1 does not significantly decrease the inequality ∆(k)
and thus to create a more social society, one has to use
a different utility function. For example, for N = 1 000,
optimizing the outcome of the weaker (which corresponds
to uα(xα, yα) = min[xα, yα]) decreases the inequality by
29% while reducing the total utility by less than 0.3%.
2.3 Serving several buyers at once
When there are several buyers in the market, the match-
maker can either find the best variant for each buyer sepa-
rately or she can compromise buyers’ needs by finding one
variant for all. While the former case is identical with our
analysis above, the latter case is different and requires the
straightforward generalization of the total utility to the
form Myα +
∑M
i=1 xi,α where M is the number of buyers
and xi,α is the utility of variant α for buyer i. For con-
sistency with our previous formalism, we introduce the
per-buyer utility
u′′α(x1,α, . . . , xM,α, yα) = yα+
1
M
M∑
i=1
xi,α := yα+ aα (7)
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Fig. 1. Inequality ∆(k) as a function of k for N = 1000. The
inset focuses on small values of k and the results are averaged
over 10 000 independent realizations.
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Fig. 2. Average utility with multiple buyers (results are aver-
aged over 1 000 independent realizations).
where aα is the average buyers’ utility of object α, the
maximal utility we denote as u′′m. When utilities xi,α are
independent and the number of buyers is large, the central
limit theorem states that the difference aα − 〈xi,α〉 is ap-
proximately a normally distributed quantity with variance
proportional to 1/M . It follows that due to the fast decay
of the normal distribution, the matchmaker cannot find an
object with the average utility aα differing substantially
from 〈xi,α〉. This is confirmed by Fig. 2 where we show
〈u′′m〉 for various values of M . As M increases, fluctua-
tions of aα gets smaller and 〈u′′m〉 ≈ 1, corresponding to
a negligible contribution of aα to u
′′
α (it can be shown that
to achieve non-negligible maxα aα, the necessary number
of variants is proportional to eM ).
Now we see that it’s impossible to satisfy several buy-
ers with one variant. Since production of an individual
variant for each buyer is often too expensive, it is then
a natural question how to compromise between the buy-
ers’ satisfaction and the costs of personalized production.
Within the given framework, one can introduce an addi-
tional cost which increases with the number of variants
produced by the vendor—such a cost forces the vendor to
narrow down the selection. This aspect of buyer-vendor
interactions is extensively studied in [19, 20] where they
show that based on the compromise described above and
a few simple additional assumptions, one can reproduce a
rich variety of market phenomena.
2.4 Correlated utilities
So far we assumed that the vendor’s and buyer’s utilities
are mutually uncorrelated. While convenient for analytical
computation, this is not a realistic assumption because in
general: what is good for the vendor is not good for the
buyer and vice versa. In other words, one expects xα and
yα to be negatively correlated.
To study the influence of correlations we first need to
find a way how to introduce them into the system. In gen-
eral it is easy to create correlated quantities by introduc-
ing a control parameter t ∈ [0, 1] and assuming that both
quantities have a common part which is proportional to
t and independent parts which are proportional to 1 − t.
However, when each part itself is uniformly distributed,
the resulting distribution depends on the value of t and
this effect distorts further analysis of the system [19]. This
motivates us to switch from uniform distributions to nor-
mal distributions which preserve their functional form un-
der addition. We assume that utilities xα and yα are ob-
tained as
xα =
√
1− tXα+
√
t Cα, yα =
√
1− t Yα+s
√
tCα (8)
where Xα, Yα, Cα are drawn from the standard normal
distribution N (0, 1), t ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter control-
ling the correlation strength and the parameter s switches
between positive (s = 1) and negative (s = −1) correla-
tions. Since when adding two normal distributions, indi-
vidual means and individual variances sum up to give the
resulting mean and variance respectively, both xα and yα
have zero mean and unit variance. It is simple to compute
the Pearson correlation coefficient of xα and yα which is
Cxy = st.
To study the system of utilities produced by Eq. (8),
we assume the linear total utility given by Eq. (1). Hence
uα is normally distributed with zero mean and its vari-
ance can be shown to be equal to 2(1 + st) := v. We are
again interested in um := max
N
α=1 uα and 〈um〉. It can be
shown (see Appendix A for details) that 〈um〉 approxi-
mately solves the equation
〈um〉 exp
[ 〈um〉2
4(1 + st)
]
= N
√
1 + st
pi
. (9)
A comparison of this result with a numerical computa-
tion of 〈um〉 (where we randomly generate the utilities
xα and yα, find the maximal total utility um and average
over many realizations) is shown in Fig. 3. As we can see,
positive correlations amplify the variance of uα and hence
allow the matchmaker to reach a higher optimal utility.
Notice that by setting t = 0 in Eq. (9), one automatically
obtains the result for normally distributed uncorrelated
utilities.
More insight can be gained if we attempt to find an
approximate solution of Eq. (9). When N is large, the
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Fig. 3. The dependence of the average maximal utility 〈um〉
on st for N = 1000 (numerical results and their standard de-
viations are obtained from 1 000 realizations of the model).
factor 〈um〉 on the left side of Eq. (9) is much smaller
than the exponential term and hence it can be neglected.
The simplified equation can be solved and gives us the
approximate result
〈um〉2 ≈ 4(1 + st) ln
[
N
√
(1 + st)/pi
]
. (10)
In contrast to Eq. (4), this time 〈um〉 grows with N with-
out bounds. On the other hand, this growth is extremely
slow: 〈um〉 is proportional to the square root of lnN . For
example, in the uncorrelated case increasing N from 1 000
to 1 000 000 increases 〈um〉 only by 50%.
3 Trading without the matchmaker
Despite all the results obtained so far, one question re-
mains open: what is the matchmaker’s contribution to the
studied vendor-buyer matchings? This question can be an-
swered by investigating matchmaker-free methods of the
variant selection.
3.1 Vendor proposes
In [19] they assumed that when the vendor offers a variant,
the buyer accepts it only if his cost is smaller than the ven-
dor’s cost (instead of maximization of utilities, they stud-
ied minimization of costs). In our framework this means
that the buyer accepts variant α only if xα ≥ yα (i.e.,
he wants to profit more than the vendor). The vendor’s
advantage is that he decides which variants to propose—
obviously, it is optimal to begin with the variant that max-
imizes yα. This concept, where proposing and accepting
sides are well defined and distinguished, is similar to the
classical Gale-Shapley algorithm known from the stable
marriage problem [15].
Based on the matching described above and using Eq. (1),
we can compute the average total utility of the selected
variant and compare it to the case with the matchmaker.
Assuming normally distributed utilities and zero correla-
tions, we studied the system numerically. As can be seen
102 103 104
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Fig. 4. The total utility of the selected variant with and
without the matchmaker. Individual utilities are drawn from
N (0, 1), results are averaged over 1 000 realizations.
in Fig. 4, the total utility with the matchmaker is consid-
erably higher. On the other hand, the inequality between
the fellows decreases from approximately 1.1 (with the
matchmaker) to approximately 0.4 (when the vendor pro-
poses). When correlations are present, the difference be-
tween the two matching methods decreases and becomes
zero for Cxy = ±1.
3.2 Buyer’s search
As we have seen, the matchmaker optimizes the total util-
ity at the cost of compromising the utilities of individuals.
The buyer can avoid being “compromised” by searching
for the best variant by himself. The drawback is that the
search is costly (it consumes buyer’s time and attention)
and the corresponding cost has to be subtracted from the
utility of the eventually selected variant. Since the time
spent by searching grows linearly with the number of ex-
amined variants, it is natural to assume the linear cost
term βN , where N is the number of examined variants
and β > 0 is the cost per examined variant. The expected
buyer’s utility is
uS(β,N) =
〈
max
1≤α≤N
xα
〉− βN := 〈xm〉 − βN. (11)
This form of the buyer’s utility was suggested in [11] where,
however, the emphasis was on the discussion of the cost
of information. In today’s computerized and networked
world, searching is easy. Hence to obtain approximate an-
alytical results, we assume that β is much smaller than
the typical utility value.
In Eq. (11), the term 〈xm〉 grows with N but the cost
βN eventually takes over and the total utility uS(β,N) de-
creases (see Fig. 5a for an illustration). This behavior is in
agreement with the classical observation “Good things sa-
tiate, bad things escalate.” by psychologists Coombs and
Avrunin [21]. It is now natural to ask, what number of
examined variants Nopt maximizes uS(β,N). We shall do
that in three distinct cases. In addition to xα drawn from
the uniform distribution U(−1, 1) and from the normal
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distribution N (0, 1), which were studied before, we con-
sider also the case when xα is drawn from the power-law
distribution f(x) = (γ − 1)x−γ , x ∈ [1,∞), γ > 2 (for
accounts on the importance of power-law distributions in
complexity management and organization see e.g. [6, 22]).
In Appendix B we find expressions for 〈xm〉 in all three
cases. Therein, the optimal number of variants Nopt is
found in the forms
uniform: Nopt = (β/2)
−1/2 − 1, (12)
normal: Nopt ≈
(
β
√
− ln(2piβ2))−1, (13)
power-law: Nopt ≈
(
β(γ − 1)/Γ (δ))−1/δ, (14)
where δ = (γ − 2)/(γ − 1). Noticeably, in all three cases
we observe a power-law dependency of Nopt on β. In the
case of uniformly distributed utilities, 〈xm〉 has an upper
bound and with N it grows very slowly (that means: there
is little to be gained by an extensive search). In conse-
quence, Nopt is proportional to β
−1/2 and hence it is little
sensitive to changes of β. When utilities are normally dis-
tributed, 〈xm〉 grows with N without bounds—this allows
Nopt to reach higher values than in the former case. In
the power-law case, values of Nopt are largest and their
dependency on β is strongest. Moreover, as the power-law
exponent γ gets closer to 2, the growth of 〈xm〉 with N
becomes linear and hence when the growth rate is larger
than β, it is optimal for the buyer to search “forever” (the
exponent δ diverges).
To review the accuracy of the presented results, in
Fig. 5 we compare them with numerical simulations. As
can be seen, good agreement is achieved in all three cases.
Let us conclude with the remark that in the power-law
case, the average, the mode, and the median of xm may
differ significantly. In consequence, it is an important ques-
tion whether the buyer should rely on 〈xm〉 which is strongly
affected by rare extreme events.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied several simplified models of inter-
actions between buyers and a vendor. Assuming that both
the vendor and the buyers can attribute certain utility val-
ues to each available variant, the decision which variant
is to be delivered can be formulated as a mathematical
optimization problem.
Firstly we assumed that there is a matchmaker who
can fairly select the optimal variant according to what is
best for all participants of the contract. A plausible cri-
terion for the matchmaker is to select the variant with
the maximal total utility. Our results show that when the
utilities are uniformly distributed, the matchmaker can
achieve the total utility close to its upper bound even
when the number of available variants is small. In other
words, little choice is enough in this case. On the other
hand, when the total utility is maximized, the difference
between utilities of the vendor and the buyer may be too
large to consider it to be the optimal choice. When the
mere summation of individual utilities is replaced by a
101 102 103
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Fig. 5. The buyer’s search for three distinct probabilistic dis-
tributions of utilities—comparison of numerical results (shown
with symbols) and analytical results (shown with lines) for
uS(0.01, N) (a) and Nopt (b); γ = 4 in both figures.
more refined expression, the inequality between the in-
volved parties may be decreased. In particular, we found
that when the matchmaker maximizes the smaller of the
two individual utilities, the inequality decreases signifi-
cantly while the total utility is almost unchanged.
When the matchmaker tries to find one variant for
several buyers, the situation turns out to be far less fa-
vorable: the number of variants needed to approach the
upper bound of the total utility grows exponentially with
the number of buyers. As a result, production of multiple
variants is advisable—this topic was extensively studied
in our previous works [19, 20]. Assuming normally dis-
tributed utilities, we studied the influence of correlations
on the system behavior. While analytically more demand-
ing, this generalization is important because it makes the
system more realistic. Our results confirm that the opti-
mal total utility depends strongly on the correlation of
utilities.
Secondly we studied the variant selection without a
matchmaker. In this case, the space of possible means of
variant selection is vast and hence we focused on two par-
ticular situations. In the first one, the vendor offers and
the buyer passively decides whether to accept the offered
variant or not. While in comparison with the matchmaker-
mediated outcome, the total utility is slightly lower (see
Fig. 4), the inequality is decreased substantially. In the
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second selection method, the buyer chooses the variant
by himself but he also has to pay the cost for examining
the variants. Here we considered three different distribu-
tions of utilities and shown that when the distribution has
a power-law tail, for the buyer it may be optimal to in-
spect a huge number of variants. In the extreme case of a
power-law distribution with the exponent lower or equal
than 2, the buyer does best by searching forever. Admit-
tedly, these results are influenced by the linear growth of
searching cost with the number of examined variants N
assumed by Eq. (11). In contrast, in psychology it is well
known that refusing the second best variant or having too
many options may be frustrating for people [23]. These ef-
fects could be included by adding an additional cost term
depending on the utility of the second best variant, or
simply by a part of the searching cost proportional to a
higher power of N .
A Extreme statistics for normally distributed
variables
In this appendix we show how 〈um〉 can be approximated
when the number of variants, N , is large. Assuming uα ∈
N (0, v), um := maxNα=1 uα has the distribution
f(um) =
Ne−u
2
m
/2v
√
2piv
(
1−
∫ ∞
um
e−u
2/2v
√
2piv
du
)N−1
. (15)
The error function erf[x] := 2√
pi
∫ x
0
exp[−t2] dt allows us to
write the integral in Eq. (15) as 12−erf[um/
√
2v]/2. When
N is large, u2m/(2v)≫ 1 and hence we can use the asymp-
totic expansion erf[x] ≈ 1− exp[−x2]/(x√pi) (taken from
mathworld.wolfram.com, the next contributing term is
proportional to exp[−x2]/x3). Again, we use the approx-
imation 1 − y ≈ exp[−y] (which is valid for y ≪ 1) to
obtain
f(um) ≈ N√
2piv
exp
[
− u
2
m
2v
− (N − 1) exp[−u
2
m/2v]
um
√
2pi/v
]
.
Unfortunately, the integral corresponding to 〈um〉 cannot
be solved. Since f(um) does not have heavy tails, a rea-
sonably precise result can be obtained by approximating
〈um〉 with u˜m maximizing f(um), yielding
〈um〉 = (N − 1)(1 + v/〈um〉2)
√
v
2pi
exp[−〈um〉2/2v].
When N is large, v/〈um〉2 ≪ 1 and hence we neglect this
term on the right side. In addition, N −1 ≈ N and we get
〈um〉 exp
[〈um〉2/2v] = N√v/2pi (16)
which after substituting v = 2(1 + st) gives Eq. (9).
B Analysis of the buyer’s search
We begin with xα ∈ U(−1, 1). Then xm has the distribu-
tion g(xm) =
N
2
[
1 − (1 − xm)/2
]N−1
and in consequence
〈xm〉 = 1− 2/(N +1). Maximizing uS(β,N) with respect
to N we get Nopt =
√
2/β − 1.
Now let’s consider xα ∈ N (0, 1). After substituting
v = 1 in Eq. (16), the expected utility uS(β,N) can be
maximized using implicit derivative, yielding the condi-
tion βN〈xm〉 = 1. In this equation, “fast” and “slow”
terms (N and 〈xm〉 respectively) are mixed together and
hence an approximate solution can be found by the fol-
lowing iterative procedure. Approximating 〈xm〉 = 1 gives
the rough estimate N0 = 1/β. Together with Eq. (16), this
value leads to the improved estimate 〈xm〉 ≈
√− ln(2piβ2)
and in turn we get
Nopt ≈
(
β
√
− ln(2piβ2))−1,
an improved estimate of Nopt.
Finally let’s study the case where utilities xα are con-
strained to the range [1,∞) and follow the power-law dis-
tribution f(xα) = (γ−1)x−γ , γ > 2. Then the cumulative
distribution is P (xα) = x
1−γ and the distribution of xm
is g(xm) = N(γ−1)x−γ(1−x1−γ)N−1. After approximat-
ing 1− x1−γm ≈ exp[−x1−γm ] (the relevant values of xm are
large) and replacing the lower integration bound with 0
we obtain 〈xm〉 ≈ N1/(γ−1)Γ [δ] where δ = (γ−2)/(γ−1);
this result is well defined for all γ > 2. When only a
fraction r of all utilities follows the power law, the re-
sult generalizes to 〈xm〉 ≈ (Nr)1/(γ−1)Γ [δ]. Maximization
of the expected utility uS(β,N) is straightforward and
yields Nopt ≈
[
β(γ−1)/Γ [δ]]−1/δ. For a different analysis
of the largest value of a power-law distributed sample and
a broader discussion of power laws see [24].
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